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Abstract 
Voluntary forest certification is an increasingly popular tool allowing producers 
who meet stringent environmental standards to label their products in the 
marketplace and potentially achieve greater market access and receive higher 
prices for their products. The voluntary nature of certification programs implies, 
however, that it is difficult to determine the effects of forest certification due to 
selection bias. This paper contributes to the impact evaluation of forest certification 
by estimating the effects of certification of non-industrial private forest owners in 
Sweden – one of the countries with the largest total area of certified forests. We 
rely on official forest inventory data at the plot level, information on certification 
status, and standard impact evaluation methods to identify the causal effect of 
certification on three environmental outcomes: environmentally important areas 
preserved during the felling, number of trees and high stumps left after the felling, 
and area set aside for conservation purposes. Moreover, we analyze the effect of 
the two most important certification schemes: the Forest Stewardship Council 
(FSC) and the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC). Our 
results indicate that certification has not improved any of these outcomes. 
Furthermore, we find no differences between the FSC and PEFC schemes. Our 
findings suggest that for forest certification to have an effect, the standards should 
be tightened and the monitoring and enforcement of forest certification schemes 
strengthened.   
Keywords: certification, impact evaluation, sustainable forest management, treatment effects, 
Sweden, FSC, PEFC. 
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1. Introduction 
Forests are among the most important repositories of terrestrial biological diversity. 
Together, tropical, temperate, and boreal forests offer highly diverse habitats for plants, animals, 
and microorganisms. Accelerated loss of old-growth forest (also termed primary or virgin forest) 
and intensive timber production have serious consequences for biodiversity conservation due to 
the loss of habitats (Angelstam et al., 2004; Folke et al., 2004).  
Forest certification is a voluntary market-driven instrument whereby an independent third 
party (called a certifier or certification body) assesses the quality of forest management in 
relation to a set of predetermined standards. The certifier gives written assurance that a product or 
process conforms to the requirements specified in the standard (Rametsteiner and Simula, 2003). 
The general objective of forest certification is to provide information to the consumers about the 
quality of forest management in areas from which traded wood products are sourced. Producers 
who meet stringent environmental standards can then label their products in the marketplace, 
allowing them to potentially achieve greater market access and receive higher prices for their 
products. An environmentally sensitive consumer base should create incentives that reward 
certified producers, encouraging non-certified producers to seek certification and its market 
benefits. In this way, certification directs demand away from uncertified forests towards products 
that meet rigorous management criteria. 
Forest certification has generated considerable attention as a mean to reverse deforestation 
and forest degradation by promoting improved environmental and social outcomes in forest 
management criteria (Auld et al., 2008). As a consequence, the global area of certified forest has 
been rapidly growing. For instance, the global area of certified forest increased from 18 million 
ha in 2000 to some 438 million ha in 2014. About 90 percent of the total area certified in 2014 is 
in the temperate and boreal climatic domains although there has also been growth, albeit at a 
slower pace, in the tropics and subtropics (FAO 2015).
i
 The voluntary nature of forest 
certification implies, however, that environmental benefits from a certification scheme may be 
limited if only the producers who are already meeting environmental standards opt into 
certification. Hence, to properly assess the effectiveness of forest certification, we need to 
account for this selection problem. Unfortunately, due to the lack of suitable information, the 
evidence regarding the impact of forest certification on environmental outcomes using rigorous 
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impact evaluation methods is very limited and finds mixed results. For example, the studies by 
Miteva et al. (2015) and Heilmayr and Lambin (2016) indicate that forest certification has 
reduced the rates of deforestation in Indonesia and Chile, respectively. In contrast, Blackman et 
al. (2015), Rico Staffron (2015), and Panlasigui (2015) find no evidence that forest certification 
has reduced deforestation in Mexico, Peru, and Cameroon, respectively. 
The present paper contributes to the impact evaluation of forest certification by 
investigating the effects of the two main certification schemes (i.e., the Forest Stewardship 
Council, FSC, and the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification, PEFC) in Sweden 
– the country with the largest total area of certified forest in Western Europe (i.e., 74% of its 28.2 
million hectares of forest are certified; see UNECE/FAO, 2012). Unlike previous studies, which 
make use of remote sensing data sources, we use detailed forest inventory data at the plot level 
before and after the felling. This ground information is able to capture subtle changes in the 
amount and composition of the forest in small areas with higher precision than remote data 
sources, thus providing more precise estimates of the effects of forest certification. Furthermore, 
in contrast to previous studies analyzing the effects of forest certification on the rates of 
deforestation, we focus on the effects on avoided degradation. This is to say, we focus on the 
effects of forest certification on the avoided quality decrease in the forest with respect to the 
initial condition – an outcome measure whose assessment calls for observations on the ground 
and that relates directly to forest management practices and to the certification standards, thus 
enhancing the policy relevance of our study. 
We investigate three key environmental outcomes on which certifications are expected 
to have an impact. First, we look at the effect of certification on the magnitude of the 
environmentally important areas preserved during the felling. The preservation of these areas is at 
the core of the standards’ environmental principles and criteria. Second, we look at the number of 
trees and high stumps remaining in the plots 5–7 years after the felling. Because of the ecological 
value of these remainders, the certification standard encourages forest owners to leave both living 
wood and high stumps after clearing. Finally, we look at the certifications’ requirement to set 
aside at least 5% of the total forest land for conservation purposes. Taking all of these 
environmental outcomes into consideration provides for a more complete assessment of the 
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overall environmental impact of certification as it allows us to take into account the short and 
medium-term effects of forest certification.  
In order to answer our research questions, we combine Swedish forestry inventory 
datasets with information on the certification status collected specifically for the purpose of this 
research. We use standard impact evaluation methods to identify the causal effect of certification 
on the outcomes. Importantly, the suitable harvesting form for the productive areas under analysis 
is clear cutting, which means that all trees are removed at once as opposed to selection cutting. 
As regrowth takes nearly 100 years, each plot is included only once in our sample. This 
eliminates the option of a panel data empirical approach.  
Our results provide no evidence to support that certification improves environmental 
performance. Certified plots are not significantly more likely to preserve the environmentally 
important areas or to increase the magnitude of the areas that are saved. Furthermore, we find no 
effects on the number of trees and high stumps left in the plots 5–7 years after the felling or in the 
magnitude of the areas set aside for conservation purposes. Interestingly, we found no statistical 
differences between the environmental performance under the FSC and PEFC schemes. Our 
findings also point out that for forest certification to decrease forest degradation, the standards 
should be tightened and the monitoring and enforcement of forest certification schemes 
strengthened.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the forest sector and the 
certification schemes in Sweden. Section 3 presents the data and Section 4 the empirical strategy. 
Results are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 discusses some policy implications and 
concludes the paper. 
2. Background  
Forestry is a key sector in Sweden. More than half of the country’s land area is productive 
forest, and forestry represents 11% of the total export income. There are several stakeholders in 
the sector, including around 330,000 private owners who own half of the productive forest. The 
other major category is private sector companies, with 25% of the productive forest (Swedish 
Forest Agency, 2014).  
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The Swedish Forestry Act states that environmentally important areas must not be 
damaged or destroyed during felling. In particular sensitive habitats, unusual trees and shrubs, 
and buffer zones have to be kept intact. Sensitive habitats are areas with high natural values 
deviating from the evenly aged production forest. Unusual trees and shrubs are those that have 
had time to develop some form of natural value, for example older, slow-growing, large or rare 
trees. Buffer zones and riparian zones are areas important for the conservation of species 
diversity in the forest floor, wetlands, lakes, and streams. The Swedish Forest Agency provides 
forest owners with detailed information about the definition of these categories, including for 
example illustrative pictures to facilitate their identification on the ground.
ii
 
Two certification schemes operate in Sweden. The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) 
certification was launched in 1998 when a working group comprising different forest 
stakeholders, including the NGO Swedish Society for Nature Conservation, introduced a national 
standard based on the international FSC guidelines. In contrast, the Programme for Endorsement 
of Forest Certification (PEFC) started in 2000 driven by private forest owner associations (see 
Johansson and Lidestav, 2011). FSC initially targeted large-scale forest companies while PEFC 
focused on small-scale private forest owners. However, at present, both standards certify any 
scale of operations from a minimum of 0.5 ha and are very similar in terms of requirements.  
Currently, 50% of all productive forest land is certified under FSC and 48% under PEFC 
(FSC Sweden, 2014; PEFC Sweden, 2014). It is possible to hold both certifications 
simultaneously. Important for our research is that all major large-scale companies are FSC 
certified, making it difficult to identify the impact of certification on these contracts due to the 
lack of a control group. Therefore, our analysis focuses on non-industrial private forest owners, 
of whose land only around 17% is certified (Johansson and Lidstav 2011). 
Adherence to forest certification is voluntary and the only eligibility requirement is to 
have productive forest with management purposes. However, the forest owners face transaction 
costs associated with the certification process. Information collected through a phone survey 
suggests that costs range between a one-time payment of around € 1,900 and an annual fee of 
€ 210.iii Because the scale of operations is typically small for non-industrial private forest owners, 
they opt for group certificates to reduce transaction costs. It is through this scheme that timber 
7 
 
suppliers for companies, associations, and larger private owners are certified. In all cases, the 
certification is valid for 5 years after which renewal is possible upon request.  
Whereas FSC and PEFC Sweden set the standards, seven certifiers manage the 
certification in practice. These certifiers are authorized by accreditation organizations, named 
Accreditation Services International (ASI) for FSC and Swedish Board for Accreditation and 
Conformity Assessment (Swedac) for PEFC. The certifiers are responsible for monitoring 
compliance with the standard and are themselves inspected by the accreditation organizations. 
For the group certificates, the lead contract holders also monitor their respective members 
through annual spot checks.  
The accreditation organizations, too, make random spot checks of certified forest every 
year to verify that the certification standards are followed. In case of violation, a Corrective 
Action Request (CAR) is issued, allowing for up to 12 months to remedy a small deviation and 
up to 3 months for a large one. After this, if the CAR is not attended to, the forest owner loses the 
certificate. Uncorrected or serious violations of a single member within a group certificate leads 
to its exclusion from the certificate. A report by WWF (Hirschberger, 2005) concluded that over 
the period 1997–2005, most CARs in Sweden concerned environmental issues, and most of the 
major transgressions concerned the failure to leave biodiversity trees and dead wood, as well as 
the lack of conservation of habitats and biotopes.  
Timber prices vary greatly depending on for instance tree species, timber quality, 
infrastructure, and geographical location. Although precise statistics are hard to obtain, 
explorative figures suggest that certified timber has a price premium of up to 5% (see, e.g., 
Swedish Forest Agency 2014).
 iv
  Forest owners may also view certification as a way to establish 
a competitive advantage in the forest product marketplace. Certification may create opportunities 
to access new markets that favor certified forest products. For example, green building and 
publishing companies give preference to certified wood products and these markets are growing 
in popularity.
 
 
In Sweden, the requirements set by FCS and PEFC regarding the preservation of 
environmentally important areas within the plots to be cleared coincide with those established in 
the Swedish Forestry Act. Therefore, we should in principle not expect certification to produce 
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any major impact on the conserved area beyond what is required by this law. However, the 
Swedish Forest Agency (2010) reports that around 30% of the inspected plots do not comply with 
the legal environmental consideration, i.e., sensitive habitats are not saved during the 
regeneration felling. Then, the first question we address in this paper is whether forest 
certification provides additional incentives to i) reduce the rate of non-compliance and ii) 
increase the share of environmentally important areas saved during regeneration felling. 
FSC and PEFC certification standards also encourage forest owners to leave both living 
wood and high stumps after clearing, as such remainders have a high ecological value. The living 
wood becomes deadwood in the long run, and deadwood is one of the most important variables 
for measuring biodiversity in Sweden. Certification requests forest owners to leave a minimum of 
10 trees per hectare and at least three high stumps per hectare. To evaluate the impact of the 
certification on this second component, we look at the number of trees and high stumps left in the 
plot 5–7 years after the felling.  
Finally, FSC and PEFC certification standards require that a minimum of 5% of the 
owner’s total forest area is set aside for conservation purposes. This area is independent of the 
plot to be cleared and has to be preserved entirely. We test whether this requisite is met and if 
there are differences in set-aside area between certified and uncertified plots.  
3. Data 
This section presents the data sources and sample size for each of the three environmental 
components of the standard under analysis. In each case, we describe in detail the outcomes, the 
definition of the treatment, and the control variables and present the corresponding descriptive 
statistics.  
3.1 Environmentally important areas  
In Sweden, all forest owners must submit a notification form to the Swedish Forest 
Agency before felling. On average, the agency receives 40,000 notifications from non-industrial 
private forest owners per year. From this pool, the agency selects a sample of plots for ground 
inspection.
v
 During this unannounced field visit, inspectors conduct a forest inventory of the plot. 
One growing season (around one year) after the felling, the agency returns to the same plot and 
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conducts another inventory in order to assess the new conditions. The information collected along 
this process is condensed in a dataset called Polytax 0/1, where 0 stands for the data collected 
before the felling and 1 stands for the data collected one year after. We base our analysis on the 
plots in Polytax 0/1 during the period 1999–2011 for non-industrial private forest owners under 
the category of regeneration felling. Our total sample includes 3,237 observations.  
For the purpose of our analysis, a key variable missing in this dataset is whether the plot 
has adhered to a certification scheme. This missing information is what has prevented Polytax 0/1 
from being used in previous analyses of the impacts of the certification program in Sweden. To 
collect such information, we conducted a phone survey where forest owners were asked about 
their certification status, date and type of certification, and other characteristics, such as 
participation in forest associations and reasons for being (and not being) certified (see Table A1 
in the Appendix).  
We successfully collected information for 1,450 plots (response rate 45%) through the 
phone survey.vi
 
After removing forest owned by legal entities (e.g., Church of Sweden and forest 
belonging to municipalities), observations lacking information on certification status or year of 
certification, and outliers and missing values, we end up with a final sample of 1,171 
observations, which we classify according to their certification status at the time of clearing. 
Table 1 lists all possible combinations and the corresponding number of observations.vii  
Table 1: Polytax 0/1. Sample size by certification status before and after clearing, and treatment 
group classification 
 
Group Certification type and moment # Observations Treatment group 
1 FSC before, no PEFC after clearing 53 T1 & T2 
2 FSC before, PEFC after clearing 20 T1  
3 PEFC before, no FSC after clearing 75 T1 & T3 
4 PEFC before, FSC after clearing 17 T1  
5 FSC & PEFC before clearing 82 T1 & T4 
6 Doesn't know the cert type 226 - 
7 FSC after, no PEFC after clearing 50 - 
8 PEFC after, no FSC after clearing 68 - 
9 Nothing before, both after clearing 64 - 
10 No FSC no PEFC at any time 516 Control group 
  Total 1,171   
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For the core results, we defined four treatments and one control group. Treatment 1 (T1) 
is the most general and includes all plots with at least one certification at the moment of clearing, 
regardless of type and whether they add the other certification after felling (247 observations, 
groups 1–5 in Table 1). We also look at the effect of each standard independently by defining 
Treatments 2 and 3. Treatment 2 (T2) includes FSC certified plots at the moment of clearing that 
were not certified according to PEFC after felling (53 observations, group 1 in Table 1). 
Similarly, Treatment 3 (T3) includes plots that were PEFC certified at the moment of clearing, 
with no FSC after felling (75 observations, group 3 in Table 1). Finally, Treatment 4 (T4) 
contains plots holding both certifications at the moment of clearing (82 observations, group 5 in 
Table 1). The control group comprises plots not certified during the entire period of analysis (516 
observations, group 10 in Table 1). 
The Polytax 0/1 data includes precise measures of the environmentally important areas 
defined by the Swedish Forest Act and required by the certifications. We define the total 
environmentally important area as the sum of the areas under sensitive habitats, buffer zones, and 
unusual trees and shrubs.
 viii
 As these areas are measured both before and after clearing by the 
inventory, we can observe the magnitude of the reduction in the total environmentally important 
area for each plot.  
From this measure, we define our outcome variables. Firstly, we classify the plots 
depending on their compliance status. A plot is in compliance if all of its environmentally 
important area was maintained during the felling. In contrast, a plot is not compliant if there is a 
reduction in the environmentally important area. Hence, the non-compliance rate is defined as a 
categorical variable taking the value 1 for any positive reduction in the relevant area and 0 if 
there is no change.  
Secondly, we look at the magnitude of the damage in hectares, measured as the difference 
in total environmentally important area before and after clearing. We also look at the magnitude 
of the damage in relative terms, i.e., as a share of the total environmentally important area before 
clearing. This is important because there could be substantial variations in the magnitude of the 
environmentally important areas across plots (e.g., the opportunity costs of preserving 
environmentally important areas might vary with the size of the plot).  
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Our hypothesis is that if forest certification promotes a more sustainable management of 
the forest, both the compliance rate and the magnitude (in absolute and relative terms) of 
environmentally important area left after clearing should be larger (and positive) for certified 
forest owners. Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the outcome variables. Note that the 
average plot size is 6.3 ha, of which less than one hectare is environmentally sensitive. This is not 
surprising as most of these areas are mainly productive forests. Furthermore, we observe that the 
average area of environmentally important areas decreases after clearing.  
 Interestingly, the share of the sample that does not comply with legal requirements is 
65%, causing an average environmental damage of 0.2 ha (which represents 28% of the initial 
environmentally important area being cleared). This is not a negligible amount if we consider that 
the Forest Agency receives around 40,000 notifications of felling every year, which results in 
roughly 8,500 ha of environmentally important areas being cleared each year. Table 2 also shows 
that, on average, the non-compliers clear 40% of the initial forest area.  
Importantly, the distribution of our dependent variable is positively skewed. The bulk of 
the data is at the left of the probability distribution, with 35% of the observations concentrated at 
the zero value and another 60% between zero and 1 hectare. For this reason we also define the 
log of the environmental damage as an outcome, as discussed in Section 4.        
Table 2: Polytax 0/1. Descriptive statistics for the outcome variables  
 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Area requested for felling (ha) 1,171 6.343 7.998 0.500 95.200 
Environmentally important areas before clearing (ha) 1,171 0.659 1.492 0.000 21.915 
Environmentally important areas after clearing (ha) 1,171 0.448 1.059 0.000 12.915 
All sample           
Non-compliance rate  1,171 0.651 0.477 0.000 1.000 
Environmental damage (ha) 1,171 0.211 1.040 0.000 21.915 
Damage as share of the initial value 1,100 0.282 0.346 0.000 1.000 
Conditional on positive environmentally important 
area before clearing 
          
Non-compliance rate  1,100 0.693 0.462 0.000 1.000 
Environmental damage (ha) 1,100 0.225 1.071 0.000 21.915 
Damage as share of the initial value 1,100 0.282 0.346 0.000 1.000 
Conditional on positive environmentally important 
area before clearing and positive damage 
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Non-compliance rate  762 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
Environmental damage (ha) 762 0.325 1.275 0.002 21.915 
Damage as share of the initial value 762 0.407 0.350 0.000 1.000 
 
 
The control variables included in our analysis are socioeconomic information about the 
owner (e.g., gender, whether the owner makes decisions about the forest management by 
him/herself, age, education, level of experience as a forest manager, i.e., low, medium, or high 
experience, whether the owner lives in or nearby the plot, and whether he/she belongs to a forest 
association).  
We also include geographic control variables, such as size of the property, its location 
within Sweden (county), habitat index as a proxy for soil productivity (classified as low, average, 
and high), and density of forest roads in the municipality where the plot is located. 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for the control variables for the entire sample. 
Note that all variables are categorical (except for age, area requested for felling, and road 
density). As shown in the table, approximately 20% of the forest owners are females, 61% are 
single decision makers, and the average age is 60. More than two-thirds have 6–40 years of 
experience of managing the forest in question and 80% live in or nearby the plot. Furthermore, 
68% of the plots have high soil productivity and 66% belong to a forest association. Finally, the 
average density of forest roads is 800 m/Km
2
. 
Table 3: Polytax 0/1. Descriptive statistics of covariates, entire sample 
 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Forest owner characteristics           
Female (dummy) 1,171 0.193 0.395 0.000 1.000 
Single decision maker (dummy) 1,171 0.615 0.487 0.000 1.000 
Age (years) 1,171 59.966 11.823 23.000 92.000 
Education up to high school (dummy) 1,171 0.384 0.487 0.000 1.000 
Up to 3 years of higher education (dummy) 1,171 0.162 0.369 0.000 1.000 
Up to 4 years of higher education (dummy) 1,171 0.171 0.376 0.000 1.000 
Other education (dummy) 1,171 0.039 0.194 0.000 1.000 
Medium level of experience (6 to 40 years) (dummy) 1,171 0.771 0.420 0.000 1.000 
High level of experience (more than 40 years) (dummy) 1,171 0.176 0.381 0.000 1.000 
Owner lives in or nearby the forest plot (dummy) 1,171 0.806 0.395 0.000 1.000 
Plot characteristics           
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Area of the plot (ha) 1,171 6.343 7.998 0.500 95.200 
High soil quality (dummy) 1,171 0.253 0.435 0.000 1.000 
Medium soil quality (dummy) 1,171 0.685 0.465 0.000 1.000 
Forest associations           
Södra (dummy) 1,171 0.295 0.456 0.000 1.000 
Mellanskog (dummy) 1,171 0.168 0.374 0.000 1.000 
Norrskog (dummy) 1,171 0.066 0.248 0.000 1.000 
Norra (dummy) 1,171 0.091 0.288 0.000 1.000 
Other (dummy) 1,171 0.036 0.186 0.000 1.000 
None (dummy) 1,171 0.343 0.475 0.000 1.000 
Municipality characteristics           
Road density (m/km
2
) 1,171 803.623 323.397 59.695 1704.137 
 
3.2 Trees and high stumps left 
Our analysis is based on Polytax 5/7. This dataset is similar to Polytax 0/1 but includes a 
different sample of randomly chosen plots at which field visits and an inventory of the condition 
of the plot were made 5 or 7 years after the felling. Thus, in contrast to Polytax 0/1, Polytax 5/7 
allows us to evaluate the effect of certification on the conditions of the plot in the medium term. 
The sample comprises 2,769 observations. Through the phone survey, we successfully 
collected information for 1,240 plots (response rate 45%). After removing non-single-private 
forest owners, observations lacking information regarding certification status or felling year, and 
outliers and missing values, we end up with a final sample of 1,070 observations, which we 
classify in Table 4 according to their certification status at the time of clearing. Unfortunately, 
due to the limited number of observations within each category, we include in the treated group 
all plots ever certified, regardless of type or moment of certification (622 plots). This slightly 
modifies the interpretation of the results as we cannot control for the certification status at the 
moment of the clearing. In the control group, we include the 448 plots that were not certified 
during the period of analysis.  
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Table 4: Polytax 5/7. Sample size by certification status before and after clearing, and treatment 
group classification 
 
Group Certification type and moment # Observations Treatment group 
1 FSC before, no PEFC after clearing 17 T1 & T2 
2 FSC before, PEFC after clearing 19 T1 & T2 
3 PEFC before, no FSC after clearing 19 T1 & T2 
4 PEFC before, FSC after clearing 7 T1 & T2 
5 FSC & PEFC before clearing 15 T1 & T2 
6 Doesn't know the cert type 191 T2 
7 FSC after, no PEFC after clearing 62 T2 
8 PEFC after, no FSC after clearing 97 T2 
9 Nothing before, both after clearing 119 T2 
10 Year of certification unknown 76 T2 
11 No FSC no PEFC at any time 448 Control group 
  Total 1,070   
 
Our outcome variables correspond to the number of trees and high stumps left (per cleared 
hectare) and the corresponding probabilities of compliance. We report the descriptive statistics of 
our outcome variables in Table 5. On average, forest owners leave 8.7 trees and 1.49 high stumps 
per hectare, which is less than the numbers required by the certification (i.e., 10 trees and three 
high stumps). Also, the rate of non-compliance with the expected density of trees is 70% and 
81% for the high stumps. These rates of non-compliance are by all means high but consistent 
with reports indicating that failure to leave biodiversity trees and dead wood is the most common 
transgression of certification standards (see Hirschberger 2005).  
In terms of the covariates for this sample, we find very similar patterns as the ones 
described for the Polytax 0/1 database, which is not surprising as the sampling procedures for 
both databases are similar. For instance, 18% of the plots are owned by female forest owners and 
65% by a single decision maker. The average age is about 60 years, 14% of the forest owners 
have up to three years of higher education, and 77% have 6–40 years of experience of managing 
their forest. Sixty-five percent of the forest owners belong to a forest association, and 82% live in 
or close to the forest plot. Finally, the road density in the municipalities is 795m/Km
2
.  
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Table 5: Polytax 5/7. Descriptive statistics  
 
Variable Obs. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Outcomes           
Number of trees left per hectare of cleared forest 1,065 8.729 11.337 0.000 115.34 
Number of high stumps per hectare of cleared forest 1,065 1.492 2.363 0.000 19.11 
Non-compliance rate (trees left)  1,065 0.697 0.460 0.000 1.000 
Non-compliance rate (high stumps)  1,065 0.812 0.391 0.000 1.000 
Covariates: Forest owner characteristics 
Area of the plot (ha) 1,070 6.777 8.856 0.500 94.20 
Female (dummy) 1,070 0.178 0.382 0.000 1.000 
Single decision maker (dummy) 1,070 0.639 0.480 0.000 1.000 
Age (years) 1,070 60.010 11.934 22.00 91.00 
Up to 3 years of higher education (dummy) 1,070 0.143 0.350 0.000 1.000 
Medium level of experience (6–40 years) (dummy) 1,070 0.765 0.424 0.000 1.000 
Forest owner belongs to a forest association (dummy) 1,070 0.645 0.479 0.000 1.000 
Owner lives in or nearby the forest plot (dummy) 1,070 0.823 0.382 0.000 1.000 
Covariates: Municipality characteristics 
Road density (m/Km2) 1,070 795.00 317.22 59.70 1704.14 
 
 
3.3 Set-aside areas 
The final database utilized in our study corresponds to the set-aside area survey conducted 
by the Swedish Forest Agency. In the survey, a random sample of small and medium-size forest 
owners is selected for a phone survey asking specifically about forest land voluntarily set aside 
for conservation purposes. Even if this data has been collected several times since 1996, we focus 
on the survey conducted 2009–2010 because it is the only survey that has included the 
certification status of the forest owner.  
As mentioned above, the units of observation are small and medium-size forest owners 
(including social and local associations, as for instance, municipalities, foundations, religious 
communities, and economic associations). The survey includes information on the municipality 
in which the land is located, whether there are voluntary set-aside areas, the size of voluntary set-
aside areas, whether the forest owner is certified, and, if so, number of years certified. We 
complemented this dataset with information from the Swedish Forest Agency on the total area 
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that the forest owner owns within a municipality. With this information, we create an 
independent variable corresponding to the share of total land that is set aside voluntarily for 
conservation purposes. We then compare whether the average shares of set-aside areas differ 
between certified and non-certified forest owners.  
Unfortunately, the data in this survey does not include sufficient information on other 
characteristics of the land or the forest owners for us to use as control variables. Fortunately, 
location allows us to control for some of the geographical variation, and size of the plot allows us 
to control for variations in the opportunity cost of setting aside areas for conservation purposes, 
as opportunity cost might vary with scale. Nonetheless, our results should be interpreted with 
caution, since the observed differences in the share of set-aside area could be explained by other 
characteristics omitted from this analysis due to lack of information.  
The dataset includes 327 small and medium-size private forest owners who participated in 
the survey. We exclude forest owners with missing information or no set-aside areas and end up 
with 283 (86%) observations with valid information on the variables of interest. Of those, 95 
observations do not hold a forest certification, 57 are certified by FSC, and 131 are certified by 
PEFC. Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the relevant variables. We observe that on 
average, forest owners set aside 8.8% of their forested area for conservation purposes, which is 
higher than the 5% required by the standard. Moreover, approximately 60% of our sample set 
aside more than 5%, while 40% set aside less than required by the standard.  
Table 6: Descriptive statistics set-aside areas 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Set-aside area (ha) 283 148.46 879.57 0.400 12588 
Productive forest (ha) 283 11178 3433 7.000 38728 
Set-aside area (%) 283 0.088 0.121 0.000 0.987 
Set aside 5% or less (dummy) 113 0.028 0.015 0.000 0.050 
Set aside more than 5% 
(dummy) 170 0.128 0.142 0.050 0.987 
Certified (dummy) 283 0.664 0.473 0.000 1.000 
Certified FSC (dummy) 152 0.375 0.486 0.000 1.000 
Certified PEFC (dummy) 226 0.580 0.495 0.000 1.000 
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4. Empirical Strategy 
As discussed before, our treatment is not a random variable since the certification 
program is voluntary. Indeed, forest owners self-select into the treatment. The challenge when 
trying to identify the causal effect of certification on the outcomes is that if there are systematic 
differences between the certified and the uncertified groups, we cannot attribute all the potential 
differences in the outcomes to certification status. Rather, the differences could be explained by 
other factors, commonly referred to as confounders.  
Tables 7 and 8 present the normalized differences in covariates between the control and 
treated groups for the Polytax 1/0 and 5/7 datasets, respectively. For each characteristic, the 
normalized difference is defined as the difference in averages by treatment status, scaled by the 
square root of the sum of the variances (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009). As a rule of thumb, 
values above 0.25 indicate that the difference between the groups is substantial and hence linear 
regression methods tend to be sensitive to the specification (Imbens and Rubin 2007). We also 
report the t-statistic for the difference in means as a reference.   
In Panel A of Table 7, we observe that even when the groups are statistically different in 
many of the characteristics, the magnitude of the difference is substantial only for the covariates 
related to location of the plots and participation in forest associations. In particular, there are 
substantial differences in the quality of the soil and there is lower road density in the control 
group. From this analysis, we can conclude that because some of the covariates differ 
substantially between the treated and control groups, the conventional OLS analysis could be 
sensitive to specification and outliers (Imbens, 2015). Furthermore, we observe that most of the 
selection into the treatment is explained by the geographic location of the plots. Figure A3 in the 
Appendix shows the location of the certified and uncertified plots in Sweden. 
  
18 
 
Table 7: Means, t-test stat, and normalized difference in covariates between the control and 
treated groups. Before and after matching Polytax 0/1 dataset. 
 
  Mean 
T-Test 
Difference 
Normalized 
Difference   Certified Non-Certified 
A. Before Matching         
Number of observations 516 247 
  Female (dummy) 0.188 0.121 -2.432 -0.129 
Single decision maker (dummy) 0.669 0.587 -2.147 -0.119 
Age (years) 60.760 59.364 -1.622 -0.088 
Education up to high school (dummy) 0.347 0.401 1.427 0.079 
Up to 3 years of higher education (dummy) 0.157 0.158 0.033 0.002 
Up to 4 years of higher education (dummy) 0.186 0.182 -0.129 -0.007 
Other education (dummy) 0.045 0.020 -1.890 -0.097 
Medium level of experience (6–40 years) (dummy) 0.756 0.789 1.044 0.057 
High level of experience (more than 40 years) 
(dummy) 0.182 0.174 -0.273 -0.015 
Owner lives in or nearby the forest plot (dummy) 0.798 0.838 1.342 0.072 
Area of the plot (ha) 6.828 5.752 -1.855 -0.097 
Medium soil quality (dummy) 0.341 0.158 -5.490 -0.292 
High soil quality (dummy) 0.581 0.810 6.306 0.340 
Forest associations (dummy) 0.477 0.830 8.928 0.491 
Road density (m/km2) 6.439 6.779 8.162 0.446 
B. After Matching         
Number of observations 102 193 
  Female (dummy) 0.127 0.135 0.176 0.015 
Single decision maker (dummy) 0.598 0.611 0.222 0.019 
Age (years) 58.392 59.218 0.581 0.051 
Education up to high school (dummy) 0.392 0.378 -0.232 -0.020 
Up to 3 years of higher education (dummy) 0.098 0.155 1.446 0.121 
Up to 4 years of higher education (dummy) 0.216 0.171 -0.908 -0.080 
Other education (dummy) 0.039 0.026 -0.592 -0.053 
Medium level of experience (6–40 years) (dummy) 0.716 0.777 1.135 0.099 
High level of experience (more than 40 years) 
(dummy) 0.176 0.181 0.104 0.009 
Owner lives in or nearby the forest plot (dummy) 0.853 0.839 -0.308 -0.026 
Area of the plot (ha) 6.210 5.932 -0.280 -0.025 
Medium soil quality (dummy) 0.216 0.192 -0.481 -0.042 
High soil quality (dummy) 0.716 0.772 1.038 0.091 
Forest associations (dummy) 0.657 0.793 2.408 0.212 
Road density (m/km2) 6.608 6.712 1.828 0.161 
Counties for which normalized difference > 0.25 before matching: 2, after matching: 0. Total number of counties: 21 
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Similar patterns can be seen for Polytax 5/7 (see Table 8), where the magnitude of the difference 
is substantial only for the covariates related to road density and the participation in forest 
associations. 
 
 
Table 8: Means, t-test stat, and normalized difference in covariates between the control and 
treated groups. Before and after matching Polytax 5/7 dataset. 
 
  Mean 
T-Test 
Difference 
Normalized 
Difference   Certified Non-Certified 
A. Before Matching         
Number of observations 448 622 . . 
Female (dummy) 0.190 0.169 -0.876 -0.039 
Single decision maker (dummy) 0.690 0.603 -2.933 -0.128 
Age (years) 60.018 60.005 -0.017 -0.001 
Education up to high school (dummy) 0.444 0.434 -0.328 -0.014 
Up to 3 years of higher education (dummy) 0.132 0.151 0.903 0.039 
Up to 4 years of higher education (dummy) 0.145 0.175 1.333 0.058 
Other education (dummy) 0.045 0.034 -0.894 -0.040 
Medium level of experience (6–40 years) (dummy) 0.770 0.762 -0.306 -0.013 
High level of experience (more than 40 years) (dummy) 0.158 0.203 1.860 0.081 
Owner lives in or nearby the  forest plot (dummy) 0.810 0.833 0.945 0.042 
Area of the plot (ha) 7.359 6.358 -0.078 -1.752 
Forest associations (dummy) 0.433 0.797 11.392 0.495 
Road density (m/km2) 704.871 859.907 7.785 0.337 
B. After Matching 
    
Number of observations 194 559 . . 
Female (dummy) 0.180 0.179 -0.047 -0.003 
Single decision maker (dummy) 0.665 0.630 -0.888 -0.052 
Age (years) 59.969 60.027 0.057 0.003 
Education up to high school (dummy) 0.418 0.449 0.763 0.045 
Up to 3 years of higher education (dummy) 0.124 0.145 0.757 0.044 
Up to 4 years of higher education (dummy) 0.175 0.159 -0.510 -0.030 
Other education (dummy) 0.041 0.029 -0.790 -0.048 
Medium level of experience (6 to 40 years) (dummy) 0.804 0.780 -0.720 -0.042 
High level of experience (more than 40 years) (dummy) 0.165 0.181 0.503 0.029 
Owner lives in or nearby the  forest plot (dummy) 0.835 0.828 -0.218 -0.013 
Area of the plot (ha) 7.300 6.313 -1.253 -0.078 
Forest associations (dummy) 0.593 0.775 4.513 0.271 
Road density (m/km2) 745.670 843.906 3.602 0.211 
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Counties for which normalized difference > 0.25 before matching: 0; after matching: 0. Total number of counties: 21 
 
To account for the potential selection bias, we first fit an OLS regression in which we control for 
observed heterogeneity by including the covariates: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽1 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 + ∑ 𝜶𝒍𝒁𝒊𝒍
𝐿
𝑙=1
+ ∑ 𝜹𝒎𝑿𝒊𝒎
𝑀
𝑚=1
+ 𝛾𝑗 +  𝜂𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 , 
where 𝑌 is the outcome for the 𝑖-th plot located in the 𝑗-th county felled at time 𝑡. For 
the analysis of the environmentally important areas, we test different definitions for the outcome: 
the cleared area (measured in absolute and relative terms) and the non-compliance rate. As the 
cleared area follows a log-normal distribution, we also use the log as outcome. Note that by 
defining the cleared area in logs, we consider only plots with a positive amount of cleared area. 
Similarly, the cleared area in relative terms includes only those plots with a positive initial value 
of environmentally important areas. For the analysis of the number of trees and high stumps left 
after felling, we define the dependent variable in relative (i.e., number of trees/stumps per 
hectare) and discrete terms (i.e., non-compliance rate).  
Both in the case of the analysis of environmentally important areas and in the case of the 
number of trees and high stumps left, the coefficient of interest is 𝛽1, which measures impact of 
certification on the outcome. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the plot is 
certified and otherwise 0 according to the previously defined treatment groups. 𝒁 is a vector of 𝐿 
forest owner characteristics, and 𝑿 is a vector of 𝑀 plot characteristics. 𝛾𝑗 are county fixed 
effects, 𝜂𝑡 are felling year fixed effects, and 𝑢𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the error term. We also estimate the average 
treatment effect on the treated (ATT) with OLS following Wooldridge (2010). This estimator 
finds the average treatment effect for the certified plots and is useful for comparing the results 
with the matching estimator.
ix
   
Before we proceed with the matching method, we make use of the propensity score 
matching method to obtain a more balanced sample. This will ensure that the results are more 
robust with any estimator (see, e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Imbens, 2015). We trim the 
sample based on the propensity score matching without replacement using one neighbor and a 
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caliper of 0.01. We choose this caliper value to select the observations that are closest in terms of 
propensity score in order to reduce the selection bias (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008).  
The characteristics we consider for the matching are those explaining the profitability of 
the certification, the intrinsic motivations for conservation, and the access to information. The 
relevance of these characteristics as determinants of certification status was revealed by the forest 
owners in our survey (see main motivation behind certification and non-certification in Table A2 
in the Appendix). For example, participation in forest associations reduces transaction cost and 
up-front payment to become certified, and hence it is expected to play an important role in the 
probability that a forest owners gets certified.  
Environmental awareness could also affect the certification status. As proxies for 
environmental awareness we include level of education and other demographic variables such as 
gender, age, experience, and how involved the forest owner is in the forest management 
(measured by whether he/she lives close to the plot and by whether he/she makes decisions on 
his/her own as opposed to with peers). As determinants of the profitability of the certification we 
include the characteristics of the plot and its location. More exactly, we include total area of the 
plot, soil quality, and density of roads to account for these geographic differences. For the 
regression adjustment, we include county and year dummy variables in addition to the set of 
covariates we used for the matching. 
We use covariate matching (CVM) after trimming the sample to estimate the average 
treatment on the treated (ATT) based on the propensity score (Imbens, 2015). For the CVM we 
consider one neighbor, and observations are matched using the Mahalanobis distance defined by 
covariates. The matching is with replacement and after matching all treated units the remaining 
bias is removed by a regression on the covariates (Abadie and Imbens, 2012).   
One advantage of the matching is that the results are less sensitive to the specification of 
the functional form (see, e.g., Imbens, 2015). With matching, we construct a control group that 
mimics the treated group in all relevant observable characteristics. This matched control group is 
intended to resemble the counterfactual, i.e., what would have happened had the treated group not 
received the certification.  
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Matching as a strategy to control for covariates is motivated by the assumption that 
conditional on observed characteristics, the potential outcomes are independent of the treatment 
assignment and that there is sufficient overlap in the characteristics of the groups so that a 
sufficiently similar counterfactual can be constructed from the data (Angrist and Pischke, 2008). 
We verify the plausibility of these assumptions in the Appendix.  
5. Results  
In this section we report the results of our analysis for each of the three environmental 
outcomes under evaluation. We start by presenting the effects of the certification on the 
environmentally important areas. For this first component, we first describe the effects of 
certification for the whole sample and then by certification status. Next, we present the results for 
the number of trees and high stumps. We close by presenting the analysis of the set-aside areas 
and running robustness checks to control for potential selectivity bias.  
   
5.1 Forest Certification and Conservation of Environmentally Important Areas  
Tables 9 and 10 present the main results for the environmentally important areas. In 
Table 9 we address the question: Does forest certification affect the probability and magnitude of 
compliance with preservation of environmentally important areas during the felling? In columns 
we compare the results obtained with different estimation strategies, and in rows we specify 
different definitions for the outcome.  
In the first column of Table 9, we show the difference in means between the treatment 
and the control. We observe that certified plots have a 3.7% lower probability of non-compliance 
compared with non-certified plots, but this difference is not statistically significant. Also, a 
smaller environmentally important area is cleared on certified plots. This difference is statistically 
significant when we define the dependent variable in logs, probably as a result of a better 
adjustment of the model.  
In the second column of Table 9, we add county and year fixed effects to account for the 
spatial and temporal variability. The results show that once we take the regional differences into 
account, there is no effect of the certification on the probability or magnitude of non-compliance. 
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This result holds when we add additional observed characteristics that could confound the effect. 
We find similar effects when computing the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) in 
column 4, which estimates the effect of certification for the certified plots. 
We present the results for the covariate matching (CVM) in the last column and find that 
the zero effect holds even when comparing the treated group with a comparable non-certified 
group. These estimates are comparable with the ATT with OLS (column 4), but the sample size is 
smaller since only matched observations are included. We note that the magnitude of the 
coefficients is fairly stable across estimation methods once we control for possible confounders, 
but the effect is not statistically different from zero in any case.    
Table 9: Effects of a forest certification on environmentally important areas. Different model 
specifications in columns and different outcome specifications in rows   
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable 
Difference in 
means 
OLS 
(year and 
county FE) 
OLS 
(all covariates) 
ATT with OLS  
(all covariates) 
ATT with CVM 
on trimmed 
sample 
Treatment 1: Any certification at the time of clearing=1, never certified=0 
Non-compliance rate -0.037 0.013 0.010 0.012 0.034 
Standard error [0.037] [0.042] [0.045] [0.052] [0.084] 
Observations 763 763 763 763 295 
R-squared 0.001 0.134 0.161 0.210   
Area cleared (ha) -0.057 0.043 0.038 0.059 0.076 
Standard error [0.069] [0.093] [0.086] [0.059] [0.101] 
Observations 763 763 763 763 295 
R-squared 0.001 0.029 0.091 0.157   
Area cleared (log) -0.430** -0.052 -0.121 -0.289 -0.037 
Standard error [0.185] [0.221] [0.233] [0.287] [0.427] 
Observations 495 495 495 495 186 
R-squared 0.011 0.093 0.184 0.275   
Area cleared (%) -0.011 0.019 0.023 0.031 0.024 
Standard error [0.028] [0.033] [0.035] [0.037] [0.060] 
Observations 715 715 715 715 273 
R-squared 0.000 0.067 0.085 0.163   
1 For simplicity we present the linear probability model (OLS), but the results also hold with non-linear probability models 
(Probit). All covariates include all variables listed in Table 3 and county and year fixed effects. Variables used for the 
matching: all variables listed in Table 3. Bias adjustment in CVM includes all covariates. Covariate matching includes one 
neighbor and estimates the average treatment effect on the treated. The sample includes 21 counties and 13 years cleared 
(%) is the change in the environmentally important areas divided by the initial value. Reported standard errors are Robust 
(White, 1980) for OLS, and Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2012) robust standard errors for covariate matching. ATT: average 
treatment on the treated. CVM: covariate matching. FE: fixed effects. OLS: ordinary least squares. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1 
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In Table 10, we look at the effects of each certification standard separately and test 
whether there are any differences between them. We also test whether holding both certifications 
simultaneously has an effect on the outcomes. We compare the treatment effects obtained by 
OLS including all covariates. We find the same results: there is no evidence that FSC or PEFC 
certification plots decrease the probability or the magnitude of non-compliance. Also, we observe 
no difference between the labels. 
Table 10: Effects of certification on environmentally important areas by certification label 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable 
FSC=1, 
Uncertified=0 
PEFC=1, 
Uncertified=0 
Both FSC and 
PEFC=1, 
uncertified=0 
FSC=1, 
PEFC=0 
Non-compliance rate 0.055 -0.026 0.015 0.073 
Standard error [0.070] [0.059] [0.075] [0.115] 
Observations 569 591 598 128 
R-squared 0.149 0.178 0.154 0.501 
Area cleared (ha) 0.193 0.007 0.058 0.316 
Standard error [0.264] [0.057] [0.073] [0.265] 
Observations 569 591 598 128 
R-squared 0.097 0.089 0.088 0.519 
Area cleared (log) 0.194 0.063 -0.041 -0.013 
Standard error [0.386] [0.330] [0.385] [0.606] 
Observations 381 383 390 82 
R-squared 0.202 0.175 0.188 0.586 
Area cleared (%) 0.063 0.042 0.003 -0.025 
Standard error [0.058] [0.051] [0.052] [0.085] 
Observations 538 551 560 119 
R-squared 0.113 0.106 0.096 0.529 
All models are OLS including all covariates.   
   
Thus, our analysis shows no evidence to support the hypothesis that forest certification 
increases the preservation of the environmentally important areas during felling. Furthermore, we 
find no difference between certification labels. This might not be a surprising result since the 
competition between FSC and PEFC has caused the certification standards to become 
increasingly similar, and as described in Section 2, the requirements of both FSC and PEFC 
coincide with those established by the Swedish Forestry Act. It raises however questions 
regarding the value-added of multiple certifications and label competition on overall 
environmental protection. 
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5.2 Forest Certification and the Number of Trees and High Stumps Left 
To analyze the effects of forest certification on the number of trees and high stumps left, 
we conduct a similar analysis as in the previous section. We present the results in Table 11. In 
columns we present either number of trees or high stumps left per hectare and compliance rates. 
In rows, we present the results for OLS and CVM by treatment. We find no robust evidence that 
certification has a significant effect on the number of trees or high stumps left.  
Table 11: Effects of certification on environmental outcomes 5–7 years after clearing 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Trees left/ha High stumps left/ha 
 
Number Non-Compliance Rate Number Non-Compliance Rate 
Certified at any time 
OLS 0.888 -0.056* 0.106 -0.000 
Standard Error [0.894] [0.033] [0.156] [0.027] 
Observations 1,065 1,065 1,065 1,065 
R-squared 0.161 0.125 0.169 0.136 
Covariate 
Matching -1.877 -0.012 -0.270 0.032 
Standard Error [1.624] [0.054] [0.322] [0.046] 
Observations 749 749 749 749 
All covariates and counties and year fixed effects included. Robust standard errors for OLS, and 
Abadie and Imbens (2006, 2012) standard errors for covariate matching in brackets. *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
5.3 Forest Certification and Set-Aside Areas 
Finally, our results show that, on average, certified owners set aside 8.8% of the land. 
This share is higher than the 5% required by the certification schemes, but is not statistically 
different to the 7.3% left by non-certified forest owners (see Table 12). Furthermore, we explore 
whether there are differences between certification types. FSC-certified forest owners set aside 
0.9% more area than non-certified forest owners; the corresponding figure for PEFC-certified 
forest owners is 2.8%. These differences are, however, not statistically significant at conventional 
levels, even when we control for geographic location by including the forest area and county 
fixed effects.   
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We are cautious in drawing conclusions from these results since, as mentioned there could 
be confounders that are not included in the analysis. Nevertheless, in line with the results 
presented in the previous sections, our analysis points to a lack of incremental effect of forest 
certification on the size of the areas set aside for conservation purposes. 
Table 12: Effects of certification on share of set-aside areas 
 
 
  
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Any 
certification 
Only 
FSC 
Only 
PEFC 
Any 
certification 
Only 
FSC 
Only 
PEFC 
Certified (dummy=1 if yes)  0.0224 0.0096 0.0280 0.0203 0.0112 0.0272 
 
[0.015] [0.016] [0.018] [0.017] [0.019] [0.020] 
Area of productive forest (thousand ha) 
  
  0.0047** 0.0023 0.0059** 
   
  [0.002] [0.002] [0.003] 
Constant 0.0731*** 0.0731*** 0.0731*** 0.0406 0.0491 0.0789 
  [0.012] [0.010] [0.014] [0.043] [0.043] [0.055] 
Control variables included NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Observations 283 152 226 283 152 226 
R-squared 0.008 0.002 0.011 0.061 0.100 0.085 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Control variables include county fixed effects. 
 
 
5.4 Robustness Checks and Potential Selectivity Bias 
Finally, we test whether selection bias affects our results as roughly half of the sample did 
not complete the survey through which we obtained the forest owners’ certification status. To this 
end, we test whether there are systematic differences in the observable characteristics between 
the samples. We present the results in Table A1 in the Appendix. We have older forest owners, 
fewer women, and some regional differences in the surveyed sample. To account for this 
potential sample selection bias, we use the two-stage Heckman model (Heckman, 1979) both for 
Polytax 0/1 and Polytax 5/7. Thus, we first use the entire sample of forest owners to estimate the 
probability that the survey is completed. The dependent variable takes the value of 1 if the survey 
was completed and zero otherwise. As explanatory variables, we include demographic variables 
that could explain the response rate and that are available for the entire sample, i.e., gender, age, 
and owner present. These variables are assumed to affect the probability of answering the survey, 
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and the previous analysis showed that they are not key determinants of the quality of the forest 
management. In the second stage, we correct for selectivity bias by including the inverse Mills 
ratio obtained from the first stage in the deforestation equation, all control variables related to the 
geographic characteristics, participation in forest association, education, experience as forest 
owner, and county and year fixed effects. In both cases, the Heckman selection model finds an 
effect of the certification almost identical to the OLS with all covariates (Column 3 in Table 9, 
and Columns 2 and 4 in Table 11). Furthermore, in all cases the lambda parameter is not 
significantly different from zero, which suggests that unobserved factors that make participation 
in the survey more likely are not associated with forest management.  
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate the effects of the two main forest certification schemes in 
Sweden, FSC and PEFC, on three key environmental outcomes embedded in the certification 
standards, namely environmentally important areas preserved during felling, number of trees and 
high stumps left after felling, and area set aside for conservation purposes. Our main result is that 
with regard to the performance of comparable non-certified forest owners, certification has not 
led to any additional improvements in these outcomes. Moreover, certified forest owners are not 
significantly more likely than similar non-certified forest owners to comply with certification 
standards. Furthermore, there is no difference between the certification schemes, which is not 
surprising given the similarity of the standards. In contrast, the geographic location of the plots, 
soil productivity, and participation in forest associations seem to be key factors explaining 
compliance with certification standards and the selection into treatment.  
Our results are robust to the model choice; OLS and propensity score matching yield 
similar qualitative results. This is not surprising given that the treated and control groups are 
quite similar in many of the characteristics to start with. Also, the results are robust to various 
alternative definitions of the treatment and outcome variables.  
Our results contribute to the evidence that forest certification is generally not associated 
with increased environmental benefits (see e.g., Blackman et al. 2015, Rico Staffron 2015, and 
Panlasigui 2015). Nevertheless, in contrast to previous studies that have focused on deforestation, 
our study provides evidence of the lack of effect of certification on avoided degradation vis-à-vis 
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the performance of comparable non-certified forest owners. Furthermore, while previous studies 
have analyzed the effects of certification in the context of developing countries, we focus on the 
case of Sweden, a developed country with the largest total area of certified forest in Western 
Europe. We acknowledge that national forest certification standards are the result of voluntary 
negotiations among stakeholders with different goals and power, and hence, are thus context-
dependent because countries and regions have different forest–industrial regimes. Nevertheless, 
the fact that empirical evidence has shown that the effects on certification are limited both in the 
context of developing and developed countries raises concerns about the role of forest 
certification as a tool to promote sustainable forest management practices. Our results seem to 
indicate that if forest certification in Sweden is to have an effect, it needs to become more 
stringent, not only when it comes to the standards but also in terms of monitoring and 
enforcement since neither certified nor non-certified owners are in compliance with the 
environmental outcomes and certification standards studied in this paper. Indeed, though the 
identification of the causal factors that might explain our results goes beyond the scope of our 
analysis, we believe that the high rates of non-compliance might be the result of the lack of clear 
definitions and quantifiable measures regarding what constitute sustainable forest management in 
the Swedish Forestry Act. Even though the Swedish Forest Act states that preservation of natural 
and environmental values should be prioritized to the same extent as forest production values, the 
lack of clear quantifiable measures makes it difficult for the certifiers to implement standards that 
are stringent enough and legitimized by society. 
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APPENDIX  
Table A1. T-tests for the difference in observed characteristics between phone survey respondents and 
non-respondents. 
 
Responded Not responded Difference 
Non-compliance rate  0.647 0.638 0.009 
Female (dummy) 0.229 0.253 -0.026* 
Age (years) 60.282 58.554 1.764*** 
Owner lives in or closeby the  forest 
plot (dummy) 0.793 0.765 0.036** 
Medium soil quality (dummy) 0.261 0.301 -0.038** 
High soil quality (dummy) 0.674 0.624 0.047*** 
Stockholms County 0.024 0.033 -0.008 
Uppsala County 0.021 0.021 -0.002 
Södermanlands County 0.036 0.037 -0.001 
Östergötlands County 0.033 0.042 -0.008 
Jönköpings County 0.038 0.033 0.006 
Kronobergs County 0.050 0.040 0.009 
Kalmar County 0.075 0.069 0.004 
Gotlands County 0.037 0.024 0.012* 
Blekinge County 0.049 0.037 0.013* 
Skåne County 0.045 0.036 0.008 
Hallands County 0.052 0.033 0.017** 
Västra Götalands County 0.083 0.072 0.012 
Värmlands County 0.050 0.059 -0.012 
Örebro County 0.041 0.044 -0.001 
Västmanlands County 0.025 0.030 -0.006 
Dalarnas County 0.041 0.042 -0.004 
Gävleborgs County 0.039 0.035 0.004 
Västernorrlands County 0.035 0.051 -0.016** 
Jämtlands County 0.060 0.061 -0.004 
Västerbottens County 0.073 0.102 -0.017* 
Figure A1: Location of certified (green circle) and uncertified plots (red diamond) within Sweden. 
Treatment 1 versus control group, Polytax 0/1  
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Table A2: Main motivation behind (non)certification: 
What is your main reason for not choosing to certify your forest? (mark only one option) Freq Percent Cum 
1: No, or not enough, information about certification 101 20 20 
2: Too expensive, not economically viable 39 8 27 
3: Demands too tough, cannot live up to them, do not want to create lock-in effects 25 5 32 
4: Not good for the environment, does not lead to sustainable forestry 7 1 33 
5: Do not know anyone who is certified 7 1 35 
 6: Too small acreage 68 13 48 
7: Other 207 40 88 
 8: Do not know 60 12 100 
Total 514 100 
 What was your main reason for becoming certified? (mark only one option) 
1: Good PR 19 3 3 
2: Economically viable 293 45 48 
3: Reasonable demands that are possible to fulfill  24 4 51 
4: Good for the environment, leads to more sustainable forestry 153 23 75 
5: Know someone / some certified 10 2 76 
6: Other 119 18 95 
7: Do not know 36 6 100 
Total 654 100 
  
Robustness checks 
In this Section we perform several robustness checks to evaluate the quality of the matching. 
Overlap assumption 
We report the normalized difference in the covariates after matching on the propensity score in 
Panel B of Table 8 for the Polytax 0/1 analysis, and in Panel B of Table 9 for Polytax 5/7. We 
observe that after matching, the normalized differences decrease substantially and the normalized 
differences for all covariates are lower than or very close to the 0.25 threshold. As a result, we 
obtain a sample that has a better overlap in all covariates. By matching on the propensity score, 
we drop 54 (22%) and 86 (16%) observations from the treated group of Polytax 0/1 and Polytax 
5/7, respectively, because they have no counterparts in the control group. We present this 
information graphically in Figures 1 and 2. We observe that the treated observations off-support 
have high propensity scores. There is good overlap between the treated and the control groups 
everywhere else in the distribution. 
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Figure A2: Histogram of the propensity score by treatment status for Polytax 0/1 
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Figure A3: Histogram of the propensity score by treatment status for Polytax 5/7 
 
 
 
 
Unconfoundedness 
Following the test proposed by Imbens (2015), we perform an analysis of the plausibility 
that our matching method meets the unconfoundedness assumption. We test whether the method 
results in a sample that is as good as random conditional on the covariates. In Table 12, we 
present the treatment effect for three “pseudo-outcomes”: area of the plot, gender, and age. We 
follow the same procedure as presented in Section 4.1 for the core results. First, we pre-process 
the sample matching on the propensity score obtained with the remaining covariates, and then we 
use covariate matching (CVM) on the trimmed sample to obtain the average treatment effect of 
the treated, which is known a priori to be zero. We conduct the analysis both for Polytax 0/1 and 
Polytax 5/7. We observe that in all three cases, the “pseudo causal effect” is not statistically 
different from zero. This result indicates that the unconfoundedness assumption could be 
reasonable in our case. 
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
Propensity Score
Untreated Treated: On support
Treated: Off support
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Table A3: Unconfoundedness assumption for Polytax 0/1 and Polytax 5/7 datasets 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  Area of the plot Female Age 
Polytax 0/1 Analysis       
Certified (dummy=1 if yes) 0.930 -0.032 -1.762 
Standard error  [0.851] [0.050] [1.623] 
P-value 0.274 0.524 0.278 
Observations 281 281 281 
Polytax 5/7 Analysis       
Certified (dummy=1 if yes) -0.227 -0.084 -0.422 
Standard error  [0.915] [0.053] [1.468] 
P-value 0.804 0.111 0.774 
Observations 747 747 747 
 
                                                          
Endnotes 
i
 PEFC is the largest forest certification scheme, representing slightly less than two-thirds of the globally 
certified forest area (243 million hectares) versus 147.4 million hectares certified by FSC (UNECE/FAO 
2012). 
ii
 The Swedish Forestry Act is a complex set of laws with some legal exceptions in cases where the 
preservation of environmentally important areas is too onerous. See Swedish Forest Agency (2011) for 
details. 
iii Exchange rate €/SEK is 9.15. These estimates are based on 65 valid answers, 50 of which reported 
having made a one-time payment of 17,421 SEK on average, and the other 15 reported an annual fee of 
1,925 SEK on average. These figures must, however, be interpreted with caution since there is great 
variation in the responses (e.g., for group certificates, the direct costs are determined by each group 
certificate organization separately and the costs consist of an affiliation fee and a yearly fee). Depending 
on the size of the forest, the affiliation fee ranges from 550 SEK to 2,500 SEK and the yearly fee from 300 
to 3,000 SEK (Prosilva Skogscertifiering AB, 2015). 
iv
 For instance, if we consider that the average price of Norway spruce sawlogs corresponded to 466 
SEK/m3, the price premium corresponds to 23.3 SEK/m3 (Swedish Forest Agency, 2014). Regarding 
access to markets, some indication about the market access of the certified products is found in a report by 
FSC (2015) indicating that that client demand for certified products is the main reason for FSC 
certification holders to become certified. 
v
 Over the period 1999–2011, the rate of inspection has ranged from a minimum of 0.4% in 1999 to a 
maximum of 1.07% in 2009 (and an average of 0.6%). The Swedish Forest Agency uses a stratified 
sample based on geographic location with slight over-representation of forest in southern Sweden.  
vi
 It was not possible to contact the other 28% of the listed forest owners because of several other reasons, 
including unidentified, wrong, blocked, or non-existent phone numbers. We present descriptive statistics 
for the difference in observed characteristics between the respondents and non-respondents in Table A1 in 
the Appendix.  
vii
 The large number of cases for which the type of certification is unknown calls for the attention. We run 
a probit analysis to understand what explains this lack of information. We find that women have less 
information and details regarding the certification status of their plots. Single decision makers and older 
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owners are also less aware of the certification status of their plots. In addition, awareness seems to 
increase both with education, experience, and participation in forest owner associations.   
viii
 We convert the number of unusual trees and shrubs into area multiplying by a factor of 0.0025, as 
suggested by the Swedish Forest Agency.  
ix
 Note that our methodology also controls for trends. This might be especially important for the number of 
trees and high stumps left as the Swedish Forest Agency (2014) reports that they have increased in the 
period 2000-2005 compared to 1993-1999. 
